diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index db9d53b879f89..8f71a17ad5442 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4298,6 +4298,18 @@ retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction + retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. @@ -4541,6 +4553,7 @@ eibrs - enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. diff --git a/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst b/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst index e899f14a4ba24..4f8a06b00f608 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) or other maintainers if you're uncertain how to handle situations that come up. It will not be considered a violation report unless you want it to be. If you are uncertain about approaching the TAB or any other maintainers, please -reach out to our conflict mediator, Mishi Choudhary . +reach out to our conflict mediator, Joanna Lee . In the end, "be kind to each other" is really what the end goal is for everybody. We know everyone is human and we all fail at times, but the diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 3d9d7ef6f8bf1..201ac8e410a94 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 216 +SUBLEVEL = 217 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index b3f1214787386..29e5675c6d4f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* @@ -146,27 +148,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with .endm -.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0 +.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 popq %r15 popq %r14 popq %r13 popq %r12 popq %rbp popq %rbx - .if \skip_r11rcx - popq %rsi - .else popq %r11 - .endif popq %r10 popq %r9 popq %r8 popq %rax - .if \skip_r11rcx - popq %rsi - .else popq %rcx - .endif popq %rdx popq %rsi .if \pop_rdi @@ -316,6 +310,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #endif +/* + * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2. + * + * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers + * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET + * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction) + * + * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value, + * which is used on the paranoid paths. + * + * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. + */ +.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + rdmsr + shl $32, %rdx + or %rdx, %rax + mov %rax, \save_reg + test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax + jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@ + lfence + jmp .Lend_\@ +.Ldo_wrmsr_\@: +.endif + + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX) + * regs. Must be called after the last RET. + */ +.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + mov \save_reg, %rdx +.else + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx +.endif + + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + /* * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths. * diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index bde3e0f85425f..2d837fb54c31b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -750,7 +750,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -759,7 +758,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popfl diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 2ba3d53ac5b11..c82136030d58f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe) /* IRQs are off. */ movq %rax, %rdi movq %rsp, %rsi + + /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */ + IBRS_ENTER + call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */ @@ -248,8 +252,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe) * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. */ syscall_return_via_sysret: - /* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */ - POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1 + IBRS_EXIT + POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 /* * Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI. @@ -301,7 +305,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -310,7 +313,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popq %r15 @@ -622,6 +624,7 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user) TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) + IBRS_EXIT #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ testb $3, CS(%rsp) @@ -1248,7 +1251,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry) */ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY - ret + /* + * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like + * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register. + */ + IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15 + + RET END(paranoid_entry) /* @@ -1276,12 +1285,20 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit) jmp .Lparanoid_exit_restore .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs: TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG + + /* + * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access + * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable. + */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14 .Lparanoid_exit_restore: jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel END(paranoid_exit) + /* * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed. */ @@ -1301,6 +1318,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */ @@ -1356,6 +1374,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) SWAPGS FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER /* * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs @@ -1461,6 +1480,8 @@ ENTRY(nmi) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx) ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER + IBRS_ENTER + /* * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're @@ -1684,6 +1705,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi: movq $-1, %rsi call do_nmi + /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index 39913770a44d5..c3c4ea4a6711a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs. */ -#include "calling.h" #include #include #include @@ -17,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include +#include "calling.h" + .section .entry.text, "ax" /* @@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat) xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15 */ cld + IBRS_ENTER + /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether @@ -253,6 +256,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe) */ TRACE_IRQS_OFF + IBRS_ENTER + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_fast_syscall_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ @@ -267,6 +272,9 @@ sysret32_from_system_call: */ STACKLEAK_ERASE TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */ + + IBRS_EXIT + movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */ @@ -408,6 +416,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat) * gate turned them off. */ TRACE_IRQS_OFF + IBRS_ENTER movq %rsp, %rdi call do_int80_syscall_32 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h index 0c814cd9ea42c..cdf39decf7340 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h @@ -5,15 +5,22 @@ /* * Declare drivers belonging to specific x86 CPUs * Similar in spirit to pci_device_id and related PCI functions + * + * The wildcard initializers are in mod_devicetable.h because + * file2alias needs them. Sigh. */ - #include +/* Get the INTEL_FAM* model defines */ +#include +/* And the X86_VENDOR_* ones */ +#include +/* Centaur FAM6 models */ +#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_A 0xa #define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D 0xd #define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO 0xf #define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins) - /** * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY @@ -26,8 +33,11 @@ * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. * - * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants - * required for this. + * Use only if you need all selectors. Otherwise use one of the shorter + * macros of the X86_MATCH_* family. If there is no matching shorthand + * macro, consider to add one. If you really need to wrap one of the macros + * into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please + * start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping. */ #define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \ _steppings, _feature, _data) { \ @@ -39,6 +49,120 @@ .driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \ } +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Macro for CPU matching + * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor + * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY + * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY + * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE() is + * set to wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \ + X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature + * @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor + * @family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @feature: A X86_FEATURE bit + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are + * set to wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, family, feature, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, \ + X86_MODEL_ANY, feature, data) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor and CPU feature + * @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor + * @feature: A X86_FEATURE bit + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are + * set to wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(vendor, feature, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, X86_FAMILY_ANY, feature, data) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_FEATURE - Macro for matching a CPU feature + * @feature: A X86_FEATURE bit + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are + * set to wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(ANY, feature, data) + +/* Transitional to keep the existing code working */ +#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(feature) X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, NULL) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL - Match vendor, family and model + * @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor + * @family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are + * set to wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \ + X86_FEATURE_ANY, data) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM - Match vendor and family + * @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY + * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor + * @family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * All other missing arguments to X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are + * set of wildcards. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM(vendor, family, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, data) + +/** + * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL - Match vendor INTEL, family 6 and model + * @model: The model name without the INTEL_FAM6_ prefix or ANY + * The model name is expanded to INTEL_FAM6_@model internally + * @data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage + * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer + * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally. + * + * The vendor is set to INTEL, the family to 6 and all other missing + * arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are set to wildcards. + * + * See X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() for further information. + */ +#define X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(model, data) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, data) + /* * Match specific microcode revisions. * diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 736b0e412344b..2ec85d7bfdff2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -286,7 +286,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER (11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ @@ -303,6 +306,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO (13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO (13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ @@ -407,7 +411,8 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ -#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ +#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ +#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(28) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 5b07573c3bc87..c1d6d8bbb7dad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ * The #define line may optionally include a comment including platform names. */ +/* Wildcard match for FAM6 so X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY) works */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ANY X86_MODEL_ANY + #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F @@ -126,6 +129,9 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL 0x57 /* Knights Landing */ #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM 0x85 /* Knights Mill */ +/* Family 5 */ +#define INTEL_FAM5_QUARK_X1000 0x09 /* Quark X1000 SoC */ + /* Useful macros */ #define INTEL_CPU_FAM_ANY(_family, _model, _driver_data) \ { \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index cef4eba03ff36..713886d5493a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */ #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass @@ -129,6 +132,13 @@ * bit available to control VERW * behavior. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /* + * Indicates RET may use predictors + * other than the RSB. With eIBRS + * enabled predictions in kernel mode + * are restricted to targets in + * kernel. + */ #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /* * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index a1ee1a760c3eb..8c898eed28941 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include /* * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells @@ -60,9 +63,9 @@ lfence; \ jmp 775b; \ 774: \ + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \ dec reg; \ jnz 771b; \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; \ /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ lfence; #else @@ -79,13 +82,6 @@ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp; #endif -#define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp) \ - call 881f; \ - int3; \ -881: \ - add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp; \ - lfence; - #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ /* @@ -155,26 +151,28 @@ #endif .endm -.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD ftr:req - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_pbrsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr -.Lskip_pbrsb_\@: +.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD + call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@ + int3 +.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@: + add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP + lfence .endm /* * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP * monstrosity above, manually. */ -.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \ - __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \ - \ftr +.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2 +.ifb \ftr2 + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr +.else + ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2 +.endif + __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) +.Lunbalanced_\@: + ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD .Lskip_rsb_\@: -#endif .endm #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ @@ -249,6 +247,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ @@ -312,6 +311,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); +extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); /* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction @@ -321,18 +323,16 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; */ #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \ - \ preempt_disable(); \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ } while (0) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \ do { \ - u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \ - \ - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, \ + spec_ctrl_current(), \ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 88cef978380bf..5571b28d35b60 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -894,12 +894,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) node_reclaim_distance = 32; #endif - /* - * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. - * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor. - */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + + /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB); + + /* + * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to + * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the + * BTC_NO bit. + */ + if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c90d91cb14341..cf5a18e261e36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -46,16 +48,40 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); -/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + +/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); /* - * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in - * x86_spec_ctrl_base. + * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ + * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). */ -static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force) +{ + if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) + return; + + this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); + + /* + * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless + * forced the update can be delayed until that time. + */ + if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); +} + +u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) +{ + return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); /* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. @@ -105,13 +131,21 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); - /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about + * spectre_v2=ibrs. + */ + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); @@ -151,31 +185,17 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } +/* + * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. + * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { - /* - * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the - * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the - * modifiable bits from the guest value. - */ - guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - - /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) - hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - - /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) - hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -705,12 +725,103 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); -#undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt - static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" +#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + /* + * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). + */ + + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + default: + break; + } + + /* + * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the + * retbleed= cmdline option. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS; + break; + default: + pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); + } + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt + static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init = @@ -740,6 +851,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n" +#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n" #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state) @@ -781,6 +893,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, }; enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { @@ -821,13 +934,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); } +static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; + static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init -spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; int ret, i; - switch (v2_cmd) { + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: @@ -853,15 +968,16 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE); + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); @@ -874,7 +990,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false; - cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; @@ -922,12 +1038,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } /* - * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not - * required. + * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, + * STIBP is not required. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -952,6 +1068,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", }; static const struct { @@ -969,6 +1086,7 @@ static const struct { { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false }, { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false }, { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, + { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -1031,6 +1149,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n", + mitigation_options[i].option); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; + } + spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; @@ -1046,6 +1182,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE; } +/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ +static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) +{ + u64 ia32_cap; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) + return; + + ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); + } +} + static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { /* @@ -1070,10 +1222,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ */ switch (mode) { case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: - /* These modes already fill RSB at vmexit */ - case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: - case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: return; case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: @@ -1083,6 +1231,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); } return; + + case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n"); + return; } pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); @@ -1113,6 +1269,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && + retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + } + mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; @@ -1129,6 +1293,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline(); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS: mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS; break; @@ -1145,10 +1313,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG); - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { - /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } switch (mode) { @@ -1156,6 +1323,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: break; + case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS); + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) + pr_warn(SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG); + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); @@ -1167,16 +1340,56 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) break; } + /* + * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and + * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET + * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk. + */ + if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) + spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); + spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); /* - * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill - * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent - * issues: + * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a + * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks + * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced. + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty, + * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor, + * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry. + * + * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB, + * regardless of the state of the RSB. + * + * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack + * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation + * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to + * protect against this type of attack. + * + * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling. * - * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+ - * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev', + * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB + * entry. + * + * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and + * eIBRS. + * + * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires + * RSB clearing. + * + * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context + * switches. + * + * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); @@ -1184,28 +1397,29 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode); /* - * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted - * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't - * supported. + * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS + * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around + * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise + * enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ - spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP); + write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true); } /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1421,16 +1635,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) break; } - /* - * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper - * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the - * case where the host does not enable it. - */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - } - /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. @@ -1448,7 +1652,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); } } @@ -1665,7 +1869,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true); if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); @@ -1900,7 +2104,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { @@ -1934,7 +2138,7 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) || - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT)) return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence"; else return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable"; @@ -1970,6 +2174,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -2016,6 +2225,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN: return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: + return retbleed_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2075,4 +2287,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at else return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 59413e741ecf1..5e1e32f1086ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1102,48 +1102,60 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { {} }; +#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) + #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) +#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + +#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) +/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ +#define RETBLEED BIT(3) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) | - BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + + VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), {} }; @@ -1251,6 +1263,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN); } + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + } + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) && !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c index 2f163e6646b6f..ad6776081e60d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c @@ -16,12 +16,17 @@ * respective wildcard entries. * * A typical table entry would be to match a specific CPU - * { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, 0x12 } - * or to match a specific CPU feature - * { X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_FOOBAR) } + * + * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL, + * X86_FEATURE_ANY, NULL); * * Fields can be wildcarded with %X86_VENDOR_ANY, %X86_FAMILY_ANY, - * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY or 0 (except for vendor) + * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY (except for vendor) + * + * asm/cpu_device_id.h contains a set of useful macros which are shortcuts + * for various common selections. The above can be shortened to: + * + * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL, NULL); * * Arrays used to match for this should also be declared using * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, ...) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index 53004dbd55c47..a03e309a0ac5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit { static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 }, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 068715a52ac10..87cfd2ee9ca0d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } if (updmsr) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false); } static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 1efcc7d4bc88e..3db407e3c4166 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "trace.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 34ee4835b0177..a7b62a00913e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "mmu.h" #include "nested.h" #include "trace.h" +#include "vmx.h" #include "x86.h" static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1; @@ -2863,35 +2864,8 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4; } - asm( - "sub $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* temporarily adjust RSP for CALL */ - "cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t" - "je 1f \n\t" - __ex("vmwrite %%" _ASM_SP ", %[HOST_RSP]") "\n\t" - "mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_state_rsp](%[loaded_vmcs]) \n\t" - "1: \n\t" - "add $%c[wordsize], %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t" /* un-adjust RSP */ - - /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - "cmpb $0, %c[launched](%[loaded_vmcs])\n\t" - - /* - * VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME clear RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} on VM-Exit, set - * RFLAGS.CF on VM-Fail Invalid and set RFLAGS.ZF on VM-Fail - * Valid. vmx_vmenter() directly "returns" RFLAGS, and so the - * results of VM-Enter is captured via CC_{SET,OUT} to vm_fail. - */ - "call vmx_vmenter\n\t" - - CC_SET(be) - : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, CC_OUT(be) (vm_fail) - : [HOST_RSP]"r"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP), - [loaded_vmcs]"r"(vmx->loaded_vmcs), - [launched]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, launched)), - [host_state_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct loaded_vmcs, host_state.rsp)), - [wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong)) - : "memory" - ); + vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, + __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr) vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..edc3f16cc1896 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H +#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1) + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 946d9205c3b6d..2850670c38bb0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "run_flags.h" #define WORD_SIZE (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) @@ -29,78 +30,12 @@ .text -/** - * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS - * - * %RFLAGS.ZF: !VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid - * %RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if - * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump - * to vmx_vmexit. - */ -ENTRY(vmx_vmenter) - /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */ - je 2f - -1: vmresume - ret - -2: vmlaunch - ret - -3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting - je 4f - ret -4: ud2 - - .pushsection .fixup, "ax" -5: jmp 3b - .popsection - - _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 5b) - _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b) - -ENDPROC(vmx_vmenter) - -/** - * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime. On a VM-Exit, control will jump - * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination - * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP. - */ -ENTRY(vmx_vmexit) -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */ - push %_ASM_AX - - /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */ - or $1, %_ASM_AX - - pop %_ASM_AX -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb: -#endif - ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE - ret -ENDPROC(vmx_vmexit) - /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode - * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) + * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @launched: %true if the VMCS has been launched + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -119,24 +54,29 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run) #endif push %_ASM_BX + /* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG1 + + /* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG3 + /* * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values. */ push %_ASM_ARG2 - /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ + /* Copy @flags to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl - /* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */ - lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 + lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp /* Load @regs to RAX. */ mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - cmpb $0, %bl + testb $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %bl /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RBX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_BX @@ -158,11 +98,25 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX - /* Enter guest mode */ - call vmx_vmenter + /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ + jz .Lvmlaunch - /* Jump on VM-Fail. */ - jbe 2f +/* + * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at + * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below. + */ +.Lvmresume: + vmresume + jmp .Lvmfail + +.Lvmlaunch: + vmlaunch + jmp .Lvmfail + + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup) + +SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */ push %_ASM_AX @@ -189,19 +143,21 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif - /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ - xor %eax, %eax + /* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ + xor %ebx, %ebx +.Lclear_regs: /* - * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded * via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values. * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during - * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. + * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return + * value. */ -1: xor %ebx, %ebx + xor %eax, %eax xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx xor %esi, %esi @@ -220,8 +176,32 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP - pop %_ASM_BX + /* + * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before + * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! + * + * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB + * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * + * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled, and a + * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET. + */ + + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\ + X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE + + + pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ + pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ + + call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host + + /* Put return value in AX */ + mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX + + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 pop %r13 @@ -234,11 +214,20 @@ ENTRY(__vmx_vcpu_run) pop %_ASM_BP ret - /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */ -2: mov $1, %eax - jmp 1b +.Lfixup: + cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting + jne .Lvmfail + ud2 +.Lvmfail: + /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ + mov $1, %_ASM_BX + jmp .Lclear_regs + ENDPROC(__vmx_vcpu_run) + +.section .text, "ax" + /** * vmread_error_trampoline - Trampoline from inline asm to vmread_error() * @field: VMCS field encoding that failed diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 4bd1bf6214eea..d522c9de41df9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -358,9 +359,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) return; - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL); msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; } @@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) return; vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); } static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) @@ -862,6 +863,24 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) return true; } +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + unsigned int flags = 0; + + if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) + flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME; + + /* + * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free + * to change it directly without causing a vmexit. In that case read + * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl. + */ + if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) + flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL; + + return flags; +} + static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) { @@ -6539,7 +6558,30 @@ void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp) } } -bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched); +void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned int flags) +{ + u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + return; + + if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL) + vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); + + /* + * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + * + * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after + * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of + * whether the guest/host values differ. + */ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) || + vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); + + barrier_nospec(); +} static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { @@ -6628,32 +6670,12 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2); vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs, - vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched); + __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx)); vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2(); vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx); - /* - * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the - * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and - * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding - * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former - * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. - * - * For non-nested case: - * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - * - * For nested case: - * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - */ - if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) - vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* All fields are clean at this point */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |= diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 7a3362ab59867..4d5be4610af84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "capabilities.h" #include "ops.h" #include "vmcs.h" +#include "run_flags.h" extern const u32 vmx_msr_index[]; extern u64 host_efer; @@ -336,6 +337,10 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); +unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); +bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, + unsigned int flags); #define POSTED_INTR_ON 0 #define POSTED_INTR_SN 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index d0b297583df88..c431a34522d6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -10329,9 +10329,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment); -bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { - return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); + return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device); diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 9b5edf1dfe9e9..7000c836951c5 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -574,6 +574,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -584,6 +590,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -596,6 +603,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, &dev_attr_srbds.attr, &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c index 4195834a45912..cf7ebe3bd1ad2 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include MODULE_AUTHOR("Paul Diefenbaugh, Dominik Brodowski"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ACPI Processor P-States Driver"); diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c b/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c index e2df9d1121063..5107cbe2d64dd 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include "cpufreq_ondemand.h" diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c index d8687868407de..b588e0e409e72 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -496,7 +495,6 @@ bool amdgpu_display_ddc_probe(struct amdgpu_connector *amdgpu_connector, static const struct drm_framebuffer_funcs amdgpu_fb_funcs = { .destroy = drm_gem_fb_destroy, .create_handle = drm_gem_fb_create_handle, - .dirty = drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb, }; uint32_t amdgpu_display_supported_domains(struct amdgpu_device *adev, diff --git a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c index 347b08b56042f..63b2212262618 100644 --- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c @@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -97,6 +99,12 @@ static struct cpuidle_state *cpuidle_state_table; */ #define CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED 0x10000 +/* + * Disable IBRS across idle (when KERNEL_IBRS), is exclusive vs IRQ_ENABLE + * above. + */ +#define CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS BIT(16) + /* * MWAIT takes an 8-bit "hint" in EAX "suggesting" * the C-state (top nibble) and sub-state (bottom nibble) @@ -107,6 +115,24 @@ static struct cpuidle_state *cpuidle_state_table; #define flg2MWAIT(flags) (((flags) >> 24) & 0xFF) #define MWAIT2flg(eax) ((eax & 0xFF) << 24) +static __cpuidle int intel_idle_ibrs(struct cpuidle_device *dev, + struct cpuidle_driver *drv, int index) +{ + bool smt_active = sched_smt_active(); + u64 spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl_current(); + int ret; + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + + ret = intel_idle(dev, drv, index); + + if (smt_active) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl); + + return ret; +} + /* * States are indexed by the cstate number, * which is also the index into the MWAIT hint array. @@ -605,7 +631,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 85, .target_residency = 200, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -613,7 +639,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = { { .name = "C7s", .desc = "MWAIT 0x33", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x33) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 124, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -621,7 +647,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = { { .name = "C8", .desc = "MWAIT 0x40", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x40) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 200, .target_residency = 800, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -629,7 +655,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = { { .name = "C9", .desc = "MWAIT 0x50", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x50) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 480, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -637,7 +663,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skl_cstates[] = { { .name = "C10", .desc = "MWAIT 0x60", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x60) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 890, .target_residency = 5000, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -666,7 +692,7 @@ static struct cpuidle_state skx_cstates[] = { { .name = "C6", .desc = "MWAIT 0x20", - .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED, + .flags = MWAIT2flg(0x20) | CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED | CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS, .exit_latency = 133, .target_residency = 600, .enter = &intel_idle, @@ -1370,6 +1396,11 @@ static void __init intel_idle_cpuidle_driver_init(void) drv->states[drv->state_count] = /* structure copy */ cpuidle_state_table[cstate]; + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) && + cpuidle_state_table[cstate].flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_IBRS) { + drv->states[drv->state_count].enter = intel_idle_ibrs; + } + drv->state_count += 1; } diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c index 510ca69746042..c83ff610ecb6c 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c @@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ restart: * The INCOMPLETE flag means that we will find the "old" * attr, not the "new" one. */ - args->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE; + args->op_flags |= XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE; state = xfs_da_state_alloc(); state->args = args; state->mp = mp; diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c index 0c23127347aca..c86ddbf6d105b 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.c @@ -2345,8 +2345,8 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int( * If we are looking for INCOMPLETE entries, show only those. * If we are looking for complete entries, show only those. */ - if ((args->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE) != - (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)) { + if (!!(args->op_flags & XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE) != + !!(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE)) { continue; } if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) { diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h index 7b74e18becff7..38c05d6ae2aa4 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_leaf.h @@ -17,13 +17,27 @@ struct xfs_inode; struct xfs_trans; /* - * Used to keep a list of "remote value" extents when unlinking an inode. + * Incore version of the attribute leaf header. */ -typedef struct xfs_attr_inactive_list { - xfs_dablk_t valueblk; /* block number of value bytes */ - int valuelen; /* number of bytes in value */ -} xfs_attr_inactive_list_t; - +struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr { + uint32_t forw; + uint32_t back; + uint16_t magic; + uint16_t count; + uint16_t usedbytes; + /* + * Firstused is 32-bit here instead of 16-bit like the on-disk variant + * to support maximum fsb size of 64k without overflow issues throughout + * the attr code. Instead, the overflow condition is handled on + * conversion to/from disk. + */ + uint32_t firstused; + __u8 holes; + struct { + uint16_t base; + uint16_t size; + } freemap[XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE]; +}; /*======================================================================== * Function prototypes for the kernel. diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c index 3e39b7d40f256..de9096b8a47c6 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.c @@ -24,6 +24,23 @@ #define ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE 1 /* # of map entries at once */ +/* + * Remote Attribute Values + * ======================= + * + * Remote extended attribute values are conceptually simple -- they're written + * to data blocks mapped by an inode's attribute fork, and they have an upper + * size limit of 64k. Setting a value does not involve the XFS log. + * + * However, on a v5 filesystem, maximally sized remote attr values require one + * block more than 64k worth of space to hold both the remote attribute value + * header (64 bytes). On a 4k block filesystem this results in a 68k buffer; + * on a 64k block filesystem, this would be a 128k buffer. Note that the log + * format can only handle a dirty buffer of XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE length (64k). + * Therefore, we /must/ ensure that remote attribute value buffers never touch + * the logging system and therefore never have a log item. + */ + /* * Each contiguous block has a header, so it is not just a simple attribute * length to FSB conversion. @@ -400,17 +417,25 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_get( (map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK)); dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock); dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount); - error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, args->trans, - mp->m_ddev_targp, - dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp, - &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops); - if (error) + bp = xfs_buf_read(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, + &xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops); + if (!bp) + return -ENOMEM; + error = bp->b_error; + if (error) { + xfs_buf_ioerror_alert(bp, __func__); + xfs_buf_relse(bp); + + /* bad CRC means corrupted metadata */ + if (error == -EFSBADCRC) + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; return error; + } error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino, &offset, &valuelen, &dst); - xfs_trans_brelse(args->trans, bp); + xfs_buf_relse(bp); if (error) return error; @@ -551,6 +576,32 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_set( return 0; } +/* Mark stale any incore buffers for the remote value. */ +int +xfs_attr_rmtval_stale( + struct xfs_inode *ip, + struct xfs_bmbt_irec *map, + xfs_buf_flags_t incore_flags) +{ + struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount; + struct xfs_buf *bp; + + ASSERT(xfs_isilocked(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)); + + ASSERT((map->br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) && + (map->br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK)); + + bp = xfs_buf_incore(mp->m_ddev_targp, + XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map->br_startblock), + XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map->br_blockcount), incore_flags); + if (bp) { + xfs_buf_stale(bp); + xfs_buf_relse(bp); + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Remove the value associated with an attribute by deleting the * out-of-line buffer that it is stored on. @@ -559,7 +610,6 @@ int xfs_attr_rmtval_remove( struct xfs_da_args *args) { - struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount; xfs_dablk_t lblkno; int blkcnt; int error; @@ -574,9 +624,6 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_remove( blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt; while (blkcnt > 0) { struct xfs_bmbt_irec map; - struct xfs_buf *bp; - xfs_daddr_t dblkno; - int dblkcnt; int nmap; /* @@ -588,21 +635,9 @@ xfs_attr_rmtval_remove( if (error) return error; ASSERT(nmap == 1); - ASSERT((map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) && - (map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK)); - - dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map.br_startblock), - dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map.br_blockcount); - - /* - * If the "remote" value is in the cache, remove it. - */ - bp = xfs_buf_incore(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, XBF_TRYLOCK); - if (bp) { - xfs_buf_stale(bp); - xfs_buf_relse(bp); - bp = NULL; - } + error = xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(args->dp, &map, XBF_TRYLOCK); + if (error) + return error; lblkno += map.br_blockcount; blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount; diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h index 9d20b66ad379e..6fb4572845ce8 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr_remote.h @@ -11,5 +11,7 @@ int xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(struct xfs_mount *mp, int attrlen); int xfs_attr_rmtval_get(struct xfs_da_args *args); int xfs_attr_rmtval_set(struct xfs_da_args *args); int xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(struct xfs_da_args *args); +int xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(struct xfs_inode *ip, struct xfs_bmbt_irec *map, + xfs_buf_flags_t incore_flags); #endif /* __XFS_ATTR_REMOTE_H__ */ diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h index ae0bbd20d9caf..588e4674e931f 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_btree.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_args { #define XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT 0x0008 /* lookup/add op, ENOENT ok, else die */ #define XFS_DA_OP_CILOOKUP 0x0010 /* lookup to return CI name if found */ #define XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL 0x0020 /* lookup to alloc buffer if found */ +#define XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE 0x0040 /* lookup INCOMPLETE attr keys */ #define XFS_DA_OP_FLAGS \ { XFS_DA_OP_JUSTCHECK, "JUSTCHECK" }, \ @@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_args { { XFS_DA_OP_ADDNAME, "ADDNAME" }, \ { XFS_DA_OP_OKNOENT, "OKNOENT" }, \ { XFS_DA_OP_CILOOKUP, "CILOOKUP" }, \ - { XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL, "ALLOCVAL" } + { XFS_DA_OP_ALLOCVAL, "ALLOCVAL" }, \ + { XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE, "INCOMPLETE" } /* * Storage for holding state during Btree searches and split/join ops. @@ -124,6 +126,19 @@ typedef struct xfs_da_state { /* for dirv2 extrablk is data */ } xfs_da_state_t; +/* + * In-core version of the node header to abstract the differences in the v2 and + * v3 disk format of the headers. Callers need to convert to/from disk format as + * appropriate. + */ +struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr { + uint32_t forw; + uint32_t back; + uint16_t magic; + uint16_t count; + uint16_t level; +}; + /* * Utility macros to aid in logging changed structure fields. */ diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c index b1ae572496b69..31bb250c18992 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "xfs_mount.h" #include "xfs_inode.h" #include "xfs_dir2.h" +#include "xfs_dir2_priv.h" /* * Shortform directory ops diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h index ae654e06b2fb6..222ee48da5e80 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_da_format.h @@ -93,19 +93,6 @@ struct xfs_da3_intnode { struct xfs_da_node_entry __btree[]; }; -/* - * In-core version of the node header to abstract the differences in the v2 and - * v3 disk format of the headers. Callers need to convert to/from disk format as - * appropriate. - */ -struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr { - uint32_t forw; - uint32_t back; - uint16_t magic; - uint16_t count; - uint16_t level; -}; - /* * Directory version 2. * @@ -434,14 +421,6 @@ struct xfs_dir3_leaf_hdr { __be32 pad; /* 64 bit alignment */ }; -struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr { - uint32_t forw; - uint32_t back; - uint16_t magic; - uint16_t count; - uint16_t stale; -}; - /* * Leaf block entry. */ @@ -520,19 +499,6 @@ struct xfs_dir3_free { #define XFS_DIR3_FREE_CRC_OFF offsetof(struct xfs_dir3_free, hdr.hdr.crc) -/* - * In core version of the free block header, abstracted away from on-disk format - * differences. Use this in the code, and convert to/from the disk version using - * xfs_dir3_free_hdr_from_disk/xfs_dir3_free_hdr_to_disk. - */ -struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr { - uint32_t magic; - uint32_t firstdb; - uint32_t nvalid; - uint32_t nused; - -}; - /* * Single block format. * @@ -709,29 +675,6 @@ struct xfs_attr3_leafblock { */ }; -/* - * incore, neutral version of the attribute leaf header - */ -struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr { - uint32_t forw; - uint32_t back; - uint16_t magic; - uint16_t count; - uint16_t usedbytes; - /* - * firstused is 32-bit here instead of 16-bit like the on-disk variant - * to support maximum fsb size of 64k without overflow issues throughout - * the attr code. Instead, the overflow condition is handled on - * conversion to/from disk. - */ - uint32_t firstused; - __u8 holes; - struct { - uint16_t base; - uint16_t size; - } freemap[XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE]; -}; - /* * Special value to represent fs block size in the leaf header firstused field. * Only used when block size overflows the 2-bytes available on disk. @@ -740,8 +683,6 @@ struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr { /* * Flags used in the leaf_entry[i].flags field. - * NOTE: the INCOMPLETE bit must not collide with the flags bits specified - * on the system call, they are "or"ed together for various operations. */ #define XFS_ATTR_LOCAL_BIT 0 /* attr is stored locally */ #define XFS_ATTR_ROOT_BIT 1 /* limit access to trusted attrs */ diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h index f542447794928..e170792c0acce 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ struct xfs_dir2_sf_entry; struct xfs_dir2_data_hdr; struct xfs_dir2_data_entry; struct xfs_dir2_data_unused; +struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr; +struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr; extern struct xfs_name xfs_name_dotdot; diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h index 59f9fb2241a5f..d2eaea663e7f2 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_priv.h @@ -8,6 +8,25 @@ struct dir_context; +/* + * In-core version of the leaf and free block headers to abstract the + * differences in the v2 and v3 disk format of the headers. + */ +struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr { + uint32_t forw; + uint32_t back; + uint16_t magic; + uint16_t count; + uint16_t stale; +}; + +struct xfs_dir3_icfree_hdr { + uint32_t magic; + uint32_t firstdb; + uint32_t nvalid; + uint32_t nused; +}; + /* xfs_dir2.c */ extern int xfs_dir2_grow_inode(struct xfs_da_args *args, int space, xfs_dir2_db_t *dbp); diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h index c968b60cee15b..28203b626f6a2 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_format.h @@ -1540,6 +1540,13 @@ typedef struct xfs_bmdr_block { #define BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_BITLEN 21 #define BMBT_STARTOFF_MASK ((1ULL << BMBT_STARTOFF_BITLEN) - 1) +#define BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_MASK ((1ULL << BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_BITLEN) - 1) + +/* + * bmbt records have a file offset (block) field that is 54 bits wide, so this + * is the largest xfs_fileoff_t that we ever expect to see. + */ +#define XFS_MAX_FILEOFF (BMBT_STARTOFF_MASK + BMBT_BLOCKCOUNT_MASK) typedef struct xfs_bmbt_rec { __be64 l0, l1; diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c index 766b1386402a0..9c88203b537b1 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_attr_inactive.c @@ -25,22 +25,18 @@ #include "xfs_error.h" /* - * Look at all the extents for this logical region, - * invalidate any buffers that are incore/in transactions. + * Invalidate any incore buffers associated with this remote attribute value + * extent. We never log remote attribute value buffers, which means that they + * won't be attached to a transaction and are therefore safe to mark stale. + * The actual bunmapi will be taken care of later. */ STATIC int -xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent( - struct xfs_trans **trans, +xfs_attr3_rmt_stale( struct xfs_inode *dp, xfs_dablk_t blkno, int blkcnt) { struct xfs_bmbt_irec map; - struct xfs_buf *bp; - xfs_dablk_t tblkno; - xfs_daddr_t dblkno; - int tblkcnt; - int dblkcnt; int nmap; int error; @@ -48,47 +44,28 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent( * Roll through the "value", invalidating the attribute value's * blocks. */ - tblkno = blkno; - tblkcnt = blkcnt; - while (tblkcnt > 0) { + while (blkcnt > 0) { /* * Try to remember where we decided to put the value. */ nmap = 1; - error = xfs_bmapi_read(dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)tblkno, tblkcnt, + error = xfs_bmapi_read(dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)blkno, blkcnt, &map, &nmap, XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK); - if (error) { + if (error) return error; - } ASSERT(nmap == 1); - ASSERT(map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK); /* - * If it's a hole, these are already unmapped - * so there's nothing to invalidate. + * Mark any incore buffers for the remote value as stale. We + * never log remote attr value buffers, so the buffer should be + * easy to kill. */ - if (map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK) { - - dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(dp->i_mount, - map.br_startblock); - dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(dp->i_mount, - map.br_blockcount); - bp = xfs_trans_get_buf(*trans, - dp->i_mount->m_ddev_targp, - dblkno, dblkcnt, 0); - if (!bp) - return -ENOMEM; - xfs_trans_binval(*trans, bp); - /* - * Roll to next transaction. - */ - error = xfs_trans_roll_inode(trans, dp); - if (error) - return error; - } + error = xfs_attr_rmtval_stale(dp, &map, 0); + if (error) + return error; - tblkno += map.br_blockcount; - tblkcnt -= map.br_blockcount; + blkno += map.br_blockcount; + blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount; } return 0; @@ -102,86 +79,45 @@ xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent( */ STATIC int xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive( - struct xfs_trans **trans, - struct xfs_inode *dp, - struct xfs_buf *bp) + struct xfs_trans **trans, + struct xfs_inode *dp, + struct xfs_buf *bp) { - struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf; - struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr; - struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry; + struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr; + struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_mount; + struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf = bp->b_addr; + struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry; struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt; - struct xfs_attr_inactive_list *list; - struct xfs_attr_inactive_list *lp; - int error; - int count; - int size; - int tmp; - int i; - struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_mount; + int error = 0; + int i; - leaf = bp->b_addr; xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(mp->m_attr_geo, &ichdr, leaf); /* - * Count the number of "remote" value extents. + * Find the remote value extents for this leaf and invalidate their + * incore buffers. */ - count = 0; entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf); for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) { - if (be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx) && - ((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0)) { - name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i); - if (name_rmt->valueblk) - count++; - } - } - - /* - * If there are no "remote" values, we're done. - */ - if (count == 0) { - xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp); - return 0; - } + int blkcnt; - /* - * Allocate storage for a list of all the "remote" value extents. - */ - size = count * sizeof(xfs_attr_inactive_list_t); - list = kmem_alloc(size, 0); - - /* - * Identify each of the "remote" value extents. - */ - lp = list; - entry = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf); - for (i = 0; i < ichdr.count; entry++, i++) { - if (be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx) && - ((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0)) { - name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i); - if (name_rmt->valueblk) { - lp->valueblk = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk); - lp->valuelen = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(dp->i_mount, - be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen)); - lp++; - } - } - } - xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp); /* unlock for trans. in freextent() */ + if (!entry->nameidx || (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL)) + continue; - /* - * Invalidate each of the "remote" value extents. - */ - error = 0; - for (lp = list, i = 0; i < count; i++, lp++) { - tmp = xfs_attr3_leaf_freextent(trans, dp, - lp->valueblk, lp->valuelen); + name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, i); + if (!name_rmt->valueblk) + continue; - if (error == 0) - error = tmp; /* save only the 1st errno */ + blkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(dp->i_mount, + be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen)); + error = xfs_attr3_rmt_stale(dp, + be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk), blkcnt); + if (error) + goto err; } - kmem_free(list); + xfs_trans_brelse(*trans, bp); +err: return error; } diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c index 203065a647652..e41c13ffa5a43 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c @@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ xfs_file_dio_aio_read( file_accessed(iocb->ki_filp); - xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); + if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_NOWAIT) { + if (!xfs_ilock_nowait(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED)) + return -EAGAIN; + } else { + xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); + } ret = iomap_dio_rw(iocb, to, &xfs_iomap_ops, NULL); xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED); diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c index 7b72c189cff0b..30202d8c25e4f 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c @@ -1513,10 +1513,8 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags( struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount; struct xfs_trans *tp = *tpp; xfs_fileoff_t first_unmap_block; - xfs_fileoff_t last_block; xfs_filblks_t unmap_len; int error = 0; - int done = 0; ASSERT(xfs_isilocked(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL)); ASSERT(!atomic_read(&VFS_I(ip)->i_count) || @@ -1536,21 +1534,22 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags( * the end of the file (in a crash where the space is allocated * but the inode size is not yet updated), simply remove any * blocks which show up between the new EOF and the maximum - * possible file size. If the first block to be removed is - * beyond the maximum file size (ie it is the same as last_block), - * then there is nothing to do. + * possible file size. + * + * We have to free all the blocks to the bmbt maximum offset, even if + * the page cache can't scale that far. */ first_unmap_block = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, (xfs_ufsize_t)new_size); - last_block = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, mp->m_super->s_maxbytes); - if (first_unmap_block == last_block) + if (first_unmap_block >= XFS_MAX_FILEOFF) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(first_unmap_block > XFS_MAX_FILEOFF); return 0; + } - ASSERT(first_unmap_block < last_block); - unmap_len = last_block - first_unmap_block + 1; - while (!done) { + unmap_len = XFS_MAX_FILEOFF - first_unmap_block + 1; + while (unmap_len > 0) { ASSERT(tp->t_firstblock == NULLFSBLOCK); - error = xfs_bunmapi(tp, ip, first_unmap_block, unmap_len, flags, - XFS_ITRUNC_MAX_EXTENTS, &done); + error = __xfs_bunmapi(tp, ip, first_unmap_block, &unmap_len, + flags, XFS_ITRUNC_MAX_EXTENTS); if (error) goto out; @@ -1570,7 +1569,7 @@ xfs_itruncate_extents_flags( if (whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) { /* Remove all pending CoW reservations. */ error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, &tp, - first_unmap_block, last_block, true); + first_unmap_block, XFS_MAX_FILEOFF, true); if (error) goto out; diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c index 904d8285c2269..dfbf3f8f1ec86 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c @@ -1544,7 +1544,8 @@ xfs_reflink_clear_inode_flag( * We didn't find any shared blocks so turn off the reflink flag. * First, get rid of any leftover CoW mappings. */ - error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, tpp, 0, NULLFILEOFF, true); + error = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_blocks(ip, tpp, 0, XFS_MAX_FILEOFF, + true); if (error) return error; diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c index 8d1df9f8be071..a3a54a0fbffea 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c @@ -512,32 +512,6 @@ xfs_showargs( seq_puts(m, ",noquota"); } -static uint64_t -xfs_max_file_offset( - unsigned int blockshift) -{ - unsigned int pagefactor = 1; - unsigned int bitshift = BITS_PER_LONG - 1; - - /* Figure out maximum filesize, on Linux this can depend on - * the filesystem blocksize (on 32 bit platforms). - * __block_write_begin does this in an [unsigned] long long... - * page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - bbits) - * So, for page sized blocks (4K on 32 bit platforms), - * this wraps at around 8Tb (hence MAX_LFS_FILESIZE which is - * (((u64)PAGE_SIZE << (BITS_PER_LONG-1))-1) - * but for smaller blocksizes it is less (bbits = log2 bsize). - */ - -#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 - ASSERT(sizeof(sector_t) == 8); - pagefactor = PAGE_SIZE; - bitshift = BITS_PER_LONG; -#endif - - return (((uint64_t)pagefactor) << bitshift) - 1; -} - /* * Set parameters for inode allocation heuristics, taking into account * filesystem size and inode32/inode64 mount options; i.e. specifically @@ -1650,6 +1624,26 @@ xfs_fs_fill_super( if (error) goto out_free_sb; + /* + * XFS block mappings use 54 bits to store the logical block offset. + * This should suffice to handle the maximum file size that the VFS + * supports (currently 2^63 bytes on 64-bit and ULONG_MAX << PAGE_SHIFT + * bytes on 32-bit), but as XFS and VFS have gotten the s_maxbytes + * calculation wrong on 32-bit kernels in the past, we'll add a WARN_ON + * to check this assertion. + * + * Avoid integer overflow by comparing the maximum bmbt offset to the + * maximum pagecache offset in units of fs blocks. + */ + if (XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE) > XFS_MAX_FILEOFF) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"MAX_LFS_FILESIZE block offset (%llu) exceeds extent map maximum (%llu)!", + XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE), + XFS_MAX_FILEOFF); + error = -EINVAL; + goto out_free_sb; + } + error = xfs_filestream_mount(mp); if (error) goto out_free_sb; @@ -1661,7 +1655,7 @@ xfs_fs_fill_super( sb->s_magic = XFS_SUPER_MAGIC; sb->s_blocksize = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize; sb->s_blocksize_bits = ffs(sb->s_blocksize) - 1; - sb->s_maxbytes = xfs_max_file_offset(sb->s_blocksize_bits); + sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE; sb->s_max_links = XFS_MAXLINK; sb->s_time_gran = 1; sb->s_time_min = S32_MIN; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 29a6fa2f518db..b42e9c4134475 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index dd4cdad76b18e..ee7d57478a454 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm) { } -static inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) +static __always_inline bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; } diff --git a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h index 4c56404e53a76..8265b99d6d55b 100644 --- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h +++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h @@ -672,9 +672,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id { __u16 steppings; }; -#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \ - { X86_VENDOR_ANY, X86_FAMILY_ANY, X86_MODEL_ANY, x } - +/* Wild cards for x86_cpu_id::vendor, family, model and feature */ #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0 #define X86_MODEL_ANY 0 diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn b/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn index 854e2ba9daa29..6a78afc6f13b4 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn +++ b/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-format-zero-length KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, pointer-to-enum-cast) KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unaligned-access) +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, cast-function-type-strict) endif endif diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 59f924e92c284..3efaf338d3257 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL (11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER (11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */ #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL (11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */