diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 6bd97cd50d625..7e061ed449aaa 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'RSB filling'   Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
   =============   ===========================================
 
+  - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
+
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence'   CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable'    CPU is vulnerable
+  'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
+  ===========================  =======================================================
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 7093e3b03b9f7..74abb7e389f33 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 209
+SUBLEVEL = 210
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8c28a2365a92b..a3e32bc938562 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@@ -406,5 +407,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(26) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index c56042916a7c3..cef4eba03ff36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@
 						 * bit available to control VERW
 						 * behavior.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
+						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index ece2b2c6d020d..1e5df3ccdd5cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -61,7 +61,16 @@
 774:						\
 	dec	reg;				\
 	jnz	771b;				\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;	\
+	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
+	lfence;
+
+#define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp)	\
+	call	881f;				\
+	int3;					\
+881:						\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp;		\
+	lfence;
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -130,6 +139,14 @@
 #else
 	call	*\reg
 #endif
+.endm
+
+.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD ftr:req
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_pbrsb_\@",				\
+		__stringify(__ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%_ASM_SP))	\
+		\ftr
+.Lskip_pbrsb_\@:
 .endm
 
  /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 09d02b1f6f71f..57efa90f3fbd0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1043,6 +1043,49 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
 
+static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
+	 * after VM exit:
+	 *
+	 * 1) RSB underflow
+	 *
+	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+	 *
+	 * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
+	 * the RSB.
+	 *
+	 * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
+	 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
+	 * because of #2.  Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
+	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+	 *
+	 * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB
+	 * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,
+	 * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed.
+	 */
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+	/* These modes already fill RSB at vmexit */
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
+			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
+	dump_stack();
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1135,6 +1178,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
+	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
+
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
 	 * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
@@ -1879,6 +1924,19 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
 	return "";
 }
 
+static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
+		else
+			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
+	} else {
+		return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected";
+	}
+}
+
 static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
@@ -1891,12 +1949,13 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
 	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
 		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
 
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
 		       spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
 		       ibpb_state(),
 		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 		       stibp_state(),
 		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+		       pbrsb_eibrs_state(),
 		       spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 305f30e45f3d3..b926b7244d42d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1025,6 +1025,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
 #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 #define NO_SPECTRE_V2		BIT(8)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(9)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -1065,7 +1066,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1075,7 +1076,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	 * good enough for our purposes.
 	 */
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT,		NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L,		NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
 	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -1236,6 +1239,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
+	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index ca4252f81bf81..946d9205c3b6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ ENTRY(vmx_vmexit)
 	pop %_ASM_AX
 .Lvmexit_skip_rsb:
 #endif
+	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
 	ret
 ENDPROC(vmx_vmexit)
 
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
index 76b7539a37a93..a06f35528c9a7 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
@@ -29,16 +29,26 @@
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "BERT: " fmt
+
+#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS 5
 #define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN 1024
 
 static int bert_disable;
 
+/*
+ * Print "all" the error records in the BERT table, but avoid huge spam to
+ * the console if the BIOS included oversize records, or too many records.
+ * Skipping some records here does not lose anything because the full
+ * data is available to user tools in:
+ *	/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT
+ */
 static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 				  unsigned int region_len)
 {
 	struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus =
 		(struct acpi_hest_generic_status *)region;
 	int remain = region_len;
+	int printed = 0, skipped = 0;
 	u32 estatus_len;
 
 	while (remain >= sizeof(struct acpi_bert_region)) {
@@ -46,24 +56,26 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 		if (remain < estatus_len) {
 			pr_err(FW_BUG "Truncated status block (length: %u).\n",
 			       estatus_len);
-			return;
+			break;
 		}
 
 		/* No more error records. */
 		if (!estatus->block_status)
-			return;
+			break;
 
 		if (cper_estatus_check(estatus)) {
 			pr_err(FW_BUG "Invalid error record.\n");
-			return;
+			break;
 		}
 
-		pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
-		if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN)
+		if (estatus_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN &&
+		    printed < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS) {
+			pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
 			cper_estatus_print(KERN_INFO HW_ERR, estatus);
-		else
-			pr_info_once("Max print length exceeded, table data is available at:\n"
-				     "/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT");
+			printed++;
+		} else {
+			skipped++;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * Because the boot error source is "one-time polled" type,
@@ -75,6 +87,9 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
 		estatus = (void *)estatus + estatus_len;
 		remain -= estatus_len;
 	}
+
+	if (skipped)
+		pr_info(HW_ERR "Skipped %d error records\n", skipped);
 }
 
 static int __init setup_bert_disable(char *str)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
index de4142723ff48..3b972ca536896 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -387,7 +387,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
 		},
 	},
@@ -395,59 +394,75 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
 	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
 		},
 	},
+	/*
+	 * The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10,
+	 * Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo
+	 * NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2. See the description
+	 * above.
+	 */
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5PU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5PU1G"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
+	.matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF4NU1F"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
+	.ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
 	.matches = {
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1401"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5NU1G"),
 		},
 	},
 	{
 	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
-	.ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
 	.matches = {
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
-		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1501"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+	.callback = video_detect_force_native,
+	.ident = "TongFang PF5LUXG",
+	.matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5LUXG"),
 		},
 	},
-
 	/*
 	 * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics
 	 * for this do not catch.
diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
index e49d1f287a175..c37d5fce86f79 100644
--- a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
+++ b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ do_adb_query(struct adb_request *req)
 
 	switch(req->data[1]) {
 	case ADB_QUERY_GETDEVINFO:
-		if (req->nbytes < 3)
+		if (req->nbytes < 3 || req->data[2] >= 16)
 			break;
 		mutex_lock(&adb_handler_mutex);
 		req->reply[0] = adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address;
diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
index 639dc8d45e603..d56837c04a81a 100644
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
@@ -460,19 +460,14 @@ int v4l2_m2m_reqbufs(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_reqbufs);
 
-int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
-		      struct v4l2_buffer *buf)
+static void v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(struct vb2_queue *vq,
+				       struct v4l2_buffer *buf)
 {
-	struct vb2_queue *vq;
-	int ret = 0;
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type);
-	ret = vb2_querybuf(vq, buf);
-
 	/* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */
 	if (buf->memory == V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP && !V4L2_TYPE_IS_OUTPUT(vq->type)) {
 		if (V4L2_TYPE_IS_MULTIPLANAR(vq->type)) {
+			unsigned int i;
+
 			for (i = 0; i < buf->length; ++i)
 				buf->m.planes[i].m.mem_offset
 					+= DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE;
@@ -480,8 +475,23 @@ int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
 			buf->m.offset += DST_QUEUE_OFF_BASE;
 		}
 	}
+}
 
-	return ret;
+int v4l2_m2m_querybuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
+		      struct v4l2_buffer *buf)
+{
+	struct vb2_queue *vq;
+	int ret;
+
+	vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type);
+	ret = vb2_querybuf(vq, buf);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */
+	v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_querybuf);
 
@@ -500,10 +510,16 @@ int v4l2_m2m_qbuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
 	ret = vb2_qbuf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf);
-	if (!ret && !(buf->flags & V4L2_BUF_FLAG_IN_REQUEST))
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */
+	v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf);
+
+	if (!(buf->flags & V4L2_BUF_FLAG_IN_REQUEST))
 		v4l2_m2m_try_schedule(m2m_ctx);
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_qbuf);
 
@@ -511,9 +527,17 @@ int v4l2_m2m_dqbuf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
 		   struct v4l2_buffer *buf)
 {
 	struct vb2_queue *vq;
+	int ret;
 
 	vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type);
-	return vb2_dqbuf(vq, buf, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+	ret = vb2_dqbuf(vq, buf, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */
+	v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_dqbuf);
 
@@ -522,9 +546,17 @@ int v4l2_m2m_prepare_buf(struct file *file, struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx,
 {
 	struct video_device *vdev = video_devdata(file);
 	struct vb2_queue *vq;
+	int ret;
 
 	vq = v4l2_m2m_get_vq(m2m_ctx, buf->type);
-	return vb2_prepare_buf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf);
+	ret = vb2_prepare_buf(vq, vdev->v4l2_dev->mdev, buf);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Adjust MMAP memory offsets for the CAPTURE queue */
+	v4l2_m2m_adjust_mem_offset(vq, buf);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(v4l2_m2m_prepare_buf);
 
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c
index 68d0c181ec7bb..1f38da5da6e45 100644
--- a/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c
+++ b/drivers/thermal/of-thermal.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static int of_thermal_get_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz,
 {
 	struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata;
 
-	if (!data->ops->get_temp)
+	if (!data->ops || !data->ops->get_temp)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return data->ops->get_temp(data->sensor_data, temp);
@@ -188,6 +188,9 @@ static int of_thermal_set_emul_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz,
 {
 	struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata;
 
+	if (!data->ops || !data->ops->set_emul_temp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return data->ops->set_emul_temp(data->sensor_data, temp);
 }
 
@@ -196,7 +199,7 @@ static int of_thermal_get_trend(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, int trip,
 {
 	struct __thermal_zone *data = tz->devdata;
 
-	if (!data->ops->get_trend)
+	if (!data->ops || !data->ops->get_trend)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return data->ops->get_trend(data->sensor_data, trip, trend);
@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ static int of_thermal_set_trip_temp(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, int trip,
 	if (trip >= data->ntrips || trip < 0)
 		return -EDOM;
 
-	if (data->ops->set_trip_temp) {
+	if (data->ops && data->ops->set_trip_temp) {
 		int ret;
 
 		ret = data->ops->set_trip_temp(data->sensor_data, trip, temp);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 34262d83dce11..f705d3752fe0d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5083,6 +5083,7 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
 	}
 
+	__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 4133c721af6ed..59f924e92c284 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 0bfad86ec960a..cb0631098f918 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -3068,7 +3068,8 @@ struct bpf_sock {
 	__u32 src_ip4;
 	__u32 src_ip6[4];
 	__u32 src_port;		/* host byte order */
-	__u32 dst_port;		/* network byte order */
+	__be16 dst_port;	/* network byte order */
+	__u16 :16;		/* zero padding */
 	__u32 dst_ip4;
 	__u32 dst_ip6[4];
 	__u32 state;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
index 0262f7b374f9c..4b9a26caa2c2e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
@@ -359,15 +359,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			 * is still (4n), fixed offset is not changed.
 			 * Also, we create a new reg->id.
 			 */
-			{29, "R5_w=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=0,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"},
+			{29, "R5_w=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=0,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"},
 			/* At the time the word size load is performed from R5,
 			 * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (18)
 			 * which is 20.  Then the variable offset is (4n), so
 			 * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
 			 * load's requirements.
 			 */
-			{33, "R4=pkt(id=4,off=22,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"},
-			{33, "R5=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"},
+			{33, "R4=pkt(id=4,off=22,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"},
+			{33, "R5=pkt(id=4,off=18,r=22,umax_value=2040,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc)"},
 		},
 	},
 	{
@@ -410,15 +410,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			/* Adding 14 makes R6 be (4n+2) */
 			{9, "R6_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
 			/* Packet pointer has (4n+2) offset */
-			{11, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
-			{13, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
+			{11, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"},
+			{13, "R4=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"},
 			/* At the time the word size load is performed from R5,
 			 * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0)
 			 * which is 2.  Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so
 			 * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
 			 * load's requirements.
 			 */
-			{15, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
+			{15, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"},
 			/* Newly read value in R6 was shifted left by 2, so has
 			 * known alignment of 4.
 			 */
@@ -426,15 +426,15 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			/* Added (4n) to packet pointer's (4n+2) var_off, giving
 			 * another (4n+2).
 			 */
-			{19, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"},
-			{21, "R4=pkt(id=2,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"},
+			{19, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"},
+			{21, "R4=pkt(id=2,off=4,r=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"},
 			/* At the time the word size load is performed from R5,
 			 * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0)
 			 * which is 2.  Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so
 			 * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
 			 * load's requirements.
 			 */
-			{23, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc))"},
+			{23, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=14,umax_value=2054,var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)"},
 		},
 	},
 	{
@@ -469,16 +469,16 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 		.matches = {
 			{4, "R5_w=pkt_end(id=0,off=0,imm=0)"},
 			/* (ptr - ptr) << 2 == unknown, (4n) */
-			{6, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{6, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372036854775804,umax_value=18446744073709551612,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"},
 			/* (4n) + 14 == (4n+2).  We blow our bounds, because
 			 * the add could overflow.
 			 */
-			{7, "R5_w=inv(id=0,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{7, "R5_w=inv(id=0,smin_value=-9223372036854775806,smax_value=9223372036854775806,umin_value=2,umax_value=18446744073709551614,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"},
 			/* Checked s>=0 */
-			{9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{9, "R5=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"},
 			/* packet pointer + nonnegative (4n+2) */
-			{11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
-			{13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{11, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"},
+			{13, "R4_w=pkt(id=1,off=4,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"},
 			/* NET_IP_ALIGN + (4n+2) == (4n), alignment is fine.
 			 * We checked the bounds, but it might have been able
 			 * to overflow if the packet pointer started in the
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			 * So we did not get a 'range' on R6, and the access
 			 * attempt will fail.
 			 */
-			{15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{15, "R6_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=9223372036854775806,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffffffffffc)"},
 		}
 	},
 	{
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			/* New unknown value in R7 is (4n) */
 			{11, "R7_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1020,var_off=(0x0; 0x3fc))"},
 			/* Subtracting it from R6 blows our unsigned bounds */
-			{12, "R6=inv(id=0,smin_value=-1006,smax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc))"},
+			{12, "R6=inv(id=0,smin_value=-1006,smax_value=1034,umin_value=2,umax_value=18446744073709551614,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffffffffffc)"},
 			/* Checked s>= 0 */
 			{14, "R6=inv(id=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
 			/* At the time the word size load is performed from R5,
@@ -537,7 +537,8 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			 * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
 			 * load's requirements.
 			 */
-			{20, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
+			{20, "R5=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1034,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)"},
+
 		},
 	},
 	{
@@ -579,18 +580,18 @@ static struct bpf_align_test tests[] = {
 			/* Adding 14 makes R6 be (4n+2) */
 			{11, "R6_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=14,umax_value=74,var_off=(0x2; 0x7c))"},
 			/* Subtracting from packet pointer overflows ubounds */
-			{13, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=8,umin_value=18446744073709551542,umax_value=18446744073709551602,var_off=(0xffffffffffffff82; 0x7c))"},
+			{13, "R5_w=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=8,umin_value=18446744073709551542,umax_value=18446744073709551602,var_off=(0xffffffffffffff82; 0x7c)"},
 			/* New unknown value in R7 is (4n), >= 76 */
 			{15, "R7_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=76,umax_value=1096,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fc))"},
 			/* Adding it to packet pointer gives nice bounds again */
-			{16, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
+			{16, "R5_w=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=0,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffc)"},
 			/* At the time the word size load is performed from R5,
 			 * its total fixed offset is NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off (0)
 			 * which is 2.  Then the variable offset is (4n+2), so
 			 * the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
 			 * load's requirements.
 			 */
-			{20, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc))"},
+			{20, "R5=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=4,umin_value=2,umax_value=1082,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffc)"},
 		},
 	},
 };
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c
index 92c02e4a1b626..313b345eddcc3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c
@@ -411,16 +411,14 @@
 	BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_1, 31),
 	/* r1 = 0xffff'fffe (NOT 0!) */
 	BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, 2),
-	/* computes OOB pointer */
+	/* error on computing OOB pointer */
 	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
-	/* OOB access */
-	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	/* exit */
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
-	.errstr = "R0 invalid mem access",
+	.errstr = "math between map_value pointer and 4294967294 is not allowed",
 	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
index 9ed192e14f5fe..b2ce50bb935b8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
@@ -121,7 +121,25 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
-	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [narrow load]",
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [word load] (backward compatibility)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load]",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -139,7 +157,64 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
-	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [load 2nd byte]",
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load]",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load] (invalid)",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+	"sk_fullsock(skb->sk): past sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -149,7 +224,7 @@
 	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
-	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetofend(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
index 6cd91970fbad3..3b2a426070c44 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
@@ -73,20 +73,19 @@ void ucall_uninit(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 
 void ucall(uint64_t cmd, int nargs, ...)
 {
-	struct ucall uc = {
-		.cmd = cmd,
-	};
+	struct ucall uc = {};
 	va_list va;
 	int i;
 
+	WRITE_ONCE(uc.cmd, cmd);
 	nargs = nargs <= UCALL_MAX_ARGS ? nargs : UCALL_MAX_ARGS;
 
 	va_start(va, nargs);
 	for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i)
-		uc.args[i] = va_arg(va, uint64_t);
+		WRITE_ONCE(uc.args[i], va_arg(va, uint64_t));
 	va_end(va);
 
-	*ucall_exit_mmio_addr = (vm_vaddr_t)&uc;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*ucall_exit_mmio_addr, (vm_vaddr_t)&uc);
 }
 
 uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 287444e52ccf8..4b445dddb7985 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -3329,8 +3329,11 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
 		kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
 		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 		list_del(&dev->vm_node);
+		if (ops->release)
+			ops->release(dev);
 		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
-		ops->destroy(dev);
+		if (ops->destroy)
+			ops->destroy(dev);
 		return ret;
 	}