diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index 500d5d8937cbb..bfb4f4fada337 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -501,17 +501,18 @@ Description: information about CPUs heterogeneity. cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#. What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..264bfa937f7de --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +GDS - Gather Data Sampling +========================== + +Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged +speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. + +Problem +------- +When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements +are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather +instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from +architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the +destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to +infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing +attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack. + +The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data. +The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector +registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be +vulnerable. + +Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks +are possible. + +Attack scenarios +---------------- +Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all +permission boundaries: + + Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data + Userspace can infer kernel data + Guests can infer data from hosts + Guest can infer guest from other guests + Users can infer data from other users + +Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in +lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves. + +The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure +that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and +allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an +attack, and re-enable it. + +Mitigation mechanism +-------------------- +This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new +bits: + + ================================ === ============================ + IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability + and mitigation support. + IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable. + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation + 0 by default. + IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes + to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored + Can't be cleared once set. + ================================ === ============================ + +GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by +disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or +"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. + +If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support. +However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that +does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM +support will break. + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- +The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or +"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default +to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will +use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems +where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation. + +GDS System Information +------------------------ +The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For +GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: + +/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling + +The possible values contained in this file are: + + ============================== ============================================= + Not affected Processor not vulnerable. + Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. + Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation. + Mitigation: AVX disabled, + no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing + mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation. + Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect. + Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in + effect and cannot be disabled. + Unknown: Dependent on + hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is + affected but with no way to know if host + processor is mitigated or vulnerable. + ============================== ============================================= + +GDS Default mitigation +---------------------- +The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's +default action is to leave the mitigation enabled. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index 2adec1e6520a6..84742be223ff8 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -16,3 +16,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst processor_mmio_stale_data.rst + gather_data_sampling.rst + srso diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..2f923c805802f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Speculative Return Stack Overflow (SRSO) +======================================== + +This is a mitigation for the speculative return stack overflow (SRSO) +vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mechanism is by now the well +known scenario of poisoning CPU functional units - the Branch Target +Buffer (BTB) and Return Address Predictor (RAP) in this case - and then +tricking the elevated privilege domain (the kernel) into leaking +sensitive data. + +AMD CPUs predict RET instructions using a Return Address Predictor (aka +Return Address Stack/Return Stack Buffer). In some cases, a non-architectural +CALL instruction (i.e., an instruction predicted to be a CALL but is +not actually a CALL) can create an entry in the RAP which may be used +to predict the target of a subsequent RET instruction. + +The specific circumstances that lead to this varies by microarchitecture +but the concern is that an attacker can mis-train the CPU BTB to predict +non-architectural CALL instructions in kernel space and use this to +control the speculative target of a subsequent kernel RET, potentially +leading to information disclosure via a speculative side-channel. + +The issue is tracked under CVE-2023-20569. + +Affected processors +------------------- + +AMD Zen, generations 1-4. That is, all families 0x17 and 0x19. Older +processors have not been investigated. + +System information and options +------------------------------ + +First of all, it is required that the latest microcode be loaded for +mitigations to be effective. + +The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow + +The possible values in this file are: + + - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + + - 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no + microcode extending IBPB functionality + to address the vulnerability has been + applied. + + - 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode + patch has been applied. It does not + address User->Kernel and Guest->Host + transitions protection but it does + address User->User and VM->VM attack + vectors. + + (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + + - 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements + the extended IBPB microcode patch + functionality by addressing User->Kernel + and Guest->Host transitions protection. + + Selected by default or by + spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret + + - 'Mitigation: IBPB' Similar protection as "safe RET" above + but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege + domain crossings (User->Kernel, + Guest->Host). + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) + + - 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider + scenario - the Guest->Host transitions + only. + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) + +In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to: + + - gain local access on the machine + + - break kASLR + + - find gadgets in the running kernel in order to use them in the exploit + + - potentially create and pin an additional workload on the sibling + thread, depending on the microarchitecture (not necessary on fam 0x19) + + - run the exploit + +Considering the performance implications of each mitigation type, the +default one is 'Mitigation: safe RET' which should take care of most +attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one. + +As always, the user is advised to keep her/his system up-to-date by +applying software updates regularly. + +The default setting will be reevaluated when needed and especially when +new attack vectors appear. + +As one can surmise, 'Mitigation: safe RET' does come at the cost of some +performance depending on the workload. If one trusts her/his userspace +and does not want to suffer the performance impact, one can always +disable the mitigation with spec_rstack_overflow=off. + +Similarly, 'Mitigation: IBPB' is another full mitigation type employing +an indrect branch prediction barrier after having applied the required +microcode patch for one's system. This mitigation comes also at +a performance cost. + +Mitigation: safe RET +-------------------- + +The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to +a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the +retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces +the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' +sequence. + +To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the +safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 +and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the +untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return +function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially +poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. + +In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation +technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and +srso_safe_ret(). diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 1f4a0523dc1ab..f1f7c068cf65b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1447,6 +1447,26 @@ Format: off | on default: on + gather_data_sampling= + [X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS) + mitigation. + + Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which + allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was + previously stored in vector registers. + + This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. + The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be + disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation + disabling AVX serves as a mitigation. + + force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without + microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode + mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in + userspace with buggy AVX enumeration. + + off: Disable GDS mitigation. + gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded. @@ -2887,22 +2907,23 @@ Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This improves system performance, but it may also expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. - Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] + Equivalent to: gather_data_sampling=off [X86] kpti=0 [ARM64] - nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] - nobp=0 [S390] - nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] - spectre_v2_user=off [X86] - spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] - ssbd=force-off [ARM64] + kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] l1tf=off [X86] mds=off [X86] - tsx_async_abort=off [X86] - kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + mmio_stale_data=off [X86] no_entry_flush [PPC] no_uaccess_flush [PPC] - mmio_stale_data=off [X86] + nobp=0 [S390] + nopti [X86,PPC] + nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] retbleed=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] + ssbd=force-off [ARM64] + tsx_async_abort=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on @@ -5120,6 +5141,17 @@ Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2_user=auto. + spec_rstack_overflow= + [X86] Control RAS overflow mitigation on AMD Zen CPUs + + off - Disable mitigation + microcode - Enable microcode mitigation only + safe-ret - Enable sw-only safe RET mitigation (default) + ibpb - Enable mitigation by issuing IBPB on + kernel entry + ibpb-vmexit - Issue IBPB only on VMEXIT + (cloud-specific mitigation) + spec_store_bypass_disable= [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7f9e1667d87d8..36047436fae33 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 10 -SUBLEVEL = 188 +SUBLEVEL = 189 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Dare mighty things diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 632d60e13494c..240277d5626c8 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -290,6 +290,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_UNCACHED config ARCH_HAS_DMA_CLEAR_UNCACHED bool +config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT + bool + # Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK bool diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 78030d1c7e7e0..0000000000000 --- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -/* - * include/asm-alpha/bugs.h - * - * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds - */ - -/* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); - */ - -/* - * I don't know of any alpha bugs yet.. Nice chip - */ - -static void check_bugs(void) -{ -} diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 985ab0b091a6a..335308aff6ce0 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config ARM default y select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if MMU select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_DMA_WRITE_COMBINE if !ARM_DMA_MEM_BUFFERABLE diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h index 97a312ba08401..fe385551edeca 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* - * arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h - * * Copyright (C) 1995-2003 Russell King */ #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H @@ -10,10 +8,8 @@ extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU -extern void check_bugs(void); extern void check_other_bugs(void); #else -#define check_bugs() do { } while (0) #define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0) #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c index 14c8dbbb7d2df..087bce6ec8e9b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include +#include #include #include @@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ void check_other_bugs(void) #endif } -void __init check_bugs(void) +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { check_writebuffer_bugs(); check_other_bugs(); diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig index 1d0579bc9d655..975b00b6034b6 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ menu "Processor type and features" config IA64 bool + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_DMA_MARK_CLEAN select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0d6b9bded56c6..0000000000000 --- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); - * - * Based on . - * - * Modified 1998, 1999, 2003 - * David Mosberger-Tang , Hewlett-Packard Co. - */ -#ifndef _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H -#define _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H - -#include - -extern void check_bugs (void); - -#endif /* _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c index dd595fbd80065..e7dd6756d5cb7 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c @@ -1071,8 +1071,7 @@ cpu_init (void) } } -void __init -check_bugs (void) +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { ia64_patch_mckinley_e9((unsigned long) __start___mckinley_e9_bundles, (unsigned long) __end___mckinley_e9_bundles); diff --git a/arch/m68k/Kconfig b/arch/m68k/Kconfig index 372e4e69c43ac..ad7a4ffd65c97 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig +++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config M68K default y select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU select ARCH_HAS_DMA_PREP_COHERENT if HAS_DMA && MMU && !COLDFIRE select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE if HAS_DMA select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG if RMW_INSNS diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 745530651e0bf..0000000000000 --- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * include/asm-m68k/bugs.h - * - * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds - */ - -/* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); - */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_MMU -extern void check_bugs(void); /* in arch/m68k/kernel/setup.c */ -#else -static void check_bugs(void) -{ -} -#endif diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c index ab8aa7be260f3..f8116660417fa 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c +++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -523,7 +524,7 @@ static int __init proc_hardware_init(void) module_init(proc_hardware_init); #endif -void check_bugs(void) +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { #if defined(CONFIG_FPU) && !defined(CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU) if (m68k_fputype == 0) { diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig index 3442bdd4314cb..57839f63074f7 100644 --- a/arch/mips/Kconfig +++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config MIPS default y select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if !64BIT select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE if MIPS_FP_SUPPORT + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE if !EVA diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h index d72dc6e1cf3cd..8d4cf29861b87 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h @@ -1,17 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * * Copyright (C) 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); */ #ifndef _ASM_BUGS_H #define _ASM_BUGS_H #include -#include #include #include @@ -30,17 +24,6 @@ static inline void check_bugs_early(void) check_bugs64_early(); } -static inline void check_bugs(void) -{ - unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - - cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; - check_bugs32(); - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) - check_bugs64(); -} - static inline int r4k_daddiu_bug(void) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c index b49ad569e4690..b7eb7dd96e179 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki */ #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -829,3 +831,14 @@ static int __init setnocoherentio(char *str) } early_param("nocoherentio", setnocoherentio); #endif + +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; + check_bugs32(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) + check_bugs64(); +} diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0a7f9db6bd1c7..0000000000000 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * include/asm-parisc/bugs.h - * - * Copyright (C) 1999 Mike Shaver - */ - -/* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); - */ - -#include - -static inline void check_bugs(void) -{ -// identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); -} diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 01b8f6ca4dbbc..0000000000000 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H -#define _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H - -/* - */ - -/* - * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for - * architecture-dependent bugs. - */ - -static inline void check_bugs(void) { } - -#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig index b6f3d49991d37..44dffe7ce50ad 100644 --- a/arch/sh/Kconfig +++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config SUPERH select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG if (GUSA_RB || CPU_SH4A) select ARCH_HAS_BINFMT_FLAT if !MMU + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index fe52abb69cea3..0000000000000 --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __ASM_SH_BUGS_H -#define __ASM_SH_BUGS_H - -/* - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Needs: - * void check_bugs(void); - */ - -/* - * I don't know of any Super-H bugs yet. - */ - -#include - -extern void select_idle_routine(void); - -static void __init check_bugs(void) -{ - extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; - char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ - - select_idle_routine(); - - current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; - - switch (current_cpu_data.family) { - case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: - *p++ = '2'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: - *p++ = '2'; - *p++ = 'a'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: - *p++ = '3'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: - *p++ = '4'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: - *p++ = '4'; - *p++ = 'a'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: - *p++ = '4'; - *p++ = 'a'; - *p++ = 'l'; - *p++ = '-'; - *p++ = 'd'; - *p++ = 's'; - *p++ = 'p'; - break; - case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: - /* - * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than - * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine - * about unhandled enumerations. - */ - break; - } - - printk("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); - -#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ - /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ - *p++ = 'e'; - *p++ = 'b'; -#endif - *p = '\0'; -} -#endif /* __ASM_SH_BUGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h index 3820d698846e0..97af2d9b02693 100644 --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h @@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ extern unsigned int instruction_size(unsigned int insn); #define instruction_size(insn) (2) #endif +void select_idle_routine(void); + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #include diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c b/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c index f59814983bd59..a80b2a5b25c7f 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c index 556e463a43d22..805c02eef5ace 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -357,3 +358,57 @@ int test_mode_pin(int pin) { return sh_mv.mv_mode_pins() & pin; } + +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ + + select_idle_routine(); + + current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; + + switch (current_cpu_data.family) { + case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: + *p++ = '2'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: + *p++ = '2'; + *p++ = 'a'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: + *p++ = '3'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: + *p++ = '4'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: + *p++ = '4'; + *p++ = 'a'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: + *p++ = '4'; + *p++ = 'a'; + *p++ = 'l'; + *p++ = '-'; + *p++ = 'd'; + *p++ = 's'; + *p++ = 'p'; + break; + case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: + /* + * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than + * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine + * about unhandled enumerations. + */ + break; + } + + pr_info("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); + +#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ + /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ + *p++ = 'e'; + *p++ = 'b'; +#endif + *p = '\0'; +} diff --git a/arch/sparc/Kconfig b/arch/sparc/Kconfig index b5ed893420591..7e2ce4c8d6571 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ config SPARC config SPARC32 def_bool !64BIT select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if !SMP select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_CPU select GENERIC_ATOMIC64 select CLZ_TAB diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 02fa369b9c21f..0000000000000 --- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* include/asm/bugs.h: Sparc probes for various bugs. - * - * Copyright (C) 1996, 2007 David S. Miller (davem@davemloft.net) - */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC32 -#include -#endif - -extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; - -static void __init check_bugs(void) -{ -#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) - cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; -#endif -} diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c index eea43a1aef1b9..8e2c7c1aad83a 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c @@ -415,3 +415,10 @@ static int __init topology_init(void) } subsys_initcall(topology_init); + +#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; +} +#endif diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig index 1c57599b82fa7..eb1c6880bde49 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options" config UML bool default y + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 4473942a08397..0000000000000 --- a/arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __UM_BUGS_H -#define __UM_BUGS_H - -void check_bugs(void); - -#endif diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c index 55930ca498e93..ca5383a8a9889 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Jeff Dike (jdike@{addtoit,linux.intel}.com) */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) setup_hostinfo(host_info, sizeof host_info); } -void __init check_bugs(void) +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { arch_check_bugs(); os_check_bugs(); diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2284666e8c90c..6dc670e363939 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if X86_32 select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI + select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE if !X86_PAE select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED @@ -2475,6 +2476,13 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to performance. +config CPU_SRSO + bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK + default y + help + Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines. + config SLS bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 @@ -2484,6 +2492,25 @@ config SLS against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly larger. +config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION + bool "Force GDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default n + help + Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows + unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in + vector registers. + + This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the + command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise + AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing + the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will + break with this option set. + + Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect. + + If in doubt, say N. + endif config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h index 92ae283899409..f25ca2d709d40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h @@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ #include -extern void check_bugs(void); - #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32) int ppro_with_ram_bug(void); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index f4cbc01c0bc46..cc3f62f5d5515 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, CPUID_7_EDX, + CPUID_8000_001F_EAX, + CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -89,8 +91,10 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -112,8 +116,10 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 1fcda82635546..2c0c495b9cb62 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ -#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ +#define NCAPINTS 21 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT ( 3*32+17) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* FREE! ( 3*32+17) */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+20) */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ @@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ @@ -302,6 +301,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+18) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */ + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ @@ -393,6 +396,17 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME (19*32+ 0) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV (19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ + +#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (20*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ @@ -433,5 +447,8 @@ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ +#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */ +/* BUG word 2 */ +#define X86_BUG_SRSO X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index 16c24915210d3..3c24378e67bea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK20 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h index 70b9bc5403c5e..94c07151a9e57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ extern int fpu__exception_code(struct fpu *fpu, int trap_nr); extern void fpu__init_cpu(void); extern void fpu__init_system_xstate(void); extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); -extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); +extern void fpu__init_system(void); extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 8f3fa55d43ce7..4406d58cf7cb6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -47,14 +47,13 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size); void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); -/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ -void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); - void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); + #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -86,6 +85,8 @@ early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { } +static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } + #define __bss_decrypted #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 3fab152809ab1..202a52e42a368 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define PRED_CMD_SBPB BIT(7) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e #define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f @@ -156,6 +157,15 @@ * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL BIT(25) /* + * CPU is vulnerable to Gather + * Data Sampling (GDS) and + * has controls for mitigation. + */ +#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO BIT(26) /* + * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather + * Data Sampling (GDS). + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* @@ -174,6 +184,8 @@ #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) #define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ +#define GDS_MITG_DIS BIT(4) /* Disable GDS mitigation */ +#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED BIT(5) /* GDS mitigation locked */ #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 @@ -519,6 +531,7 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_ICIBSEXTDCTL 0xc001103c #define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d #define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */ +#define MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH 0xc001011e #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB 0xc0010130 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131 #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index f14cdf9512493..99fbce2c1c7c1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ * eventually turn into it's own annotation. */ .macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY +#if (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE nop #endif @@ -173,12 +173,18 @@ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET -#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) +#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \ + defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO) ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ + "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS +#endif .endm #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ @@ -191,6 +197,8 @@ extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); +extern void srso_untrain_ret(void); +extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void); extern void entry_ibpb(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE @@ -300,11 +308,11 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature) : "memory"); } +extern u64 x86_pred_cmd; + static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { - u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB; - - alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); } /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index 60514502ead67..6a9de5b1fe458 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -808,9 +808,11 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, msr_misc_features_shadow); #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD extern u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu); extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void); +extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void); #else static inline u16 amd_get_nb_id(int cpu) { return 0; } static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void) { return 0; } +static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) { return false; } #endif static inline uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(const char *sig, uint32_t leaves) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index 3ff0d48469f28..9bf60a8b9e9c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK20 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 3d99a823ffac7..ffecf4e9444ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -1282,6 +1282,25 @@ void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr) } } +bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void) +{ + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) { + /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */ + case 0x17: + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB); + case 0x19: + /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */ + if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); + return true; + } else { + return false; + } + default: + return false; + } +} + static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) { struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id()); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c81b8b029b680..d31639e3ce282 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup). */ #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -27,8 +26,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include -#include #include #include #include @@ -48,6 +45,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void); static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void); /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; @@ -57,6 +56,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); +u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); /* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */ @@ -116,21 +118,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear); -void __init check_bugs(void) +void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) { - identify_boot_cpu(); - - /* - * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the - * core code know. - */ - cpu_smt_check_topology(); - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { - pr_info("CPU: "); - print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); - } - /* * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD @@ -166,39 +155,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); srbds_select_mitigation(); - - arch_smt_update(); - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - /* - * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. - * - * - i386 is no longer supported. - * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be - * compiled for a i486. - */ - if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) - panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); - - init_utsname()->machine[1] = - '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); - alternative_instructions(); - - fpu__init_check_bugs(); -#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ - alternative_instructions(); - - /* - * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages - * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping - * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. - * - * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems - * very little benefit for that case. - */ - if (!direct_gbpages) - set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); -#endif + gds_select_mitigation(); + srso_select_mitigation(); } /* @@ -656,6 +614,149 @@ static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt + +enum gds_mitigations { + GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, + GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, + GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, + GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, + GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, +}; + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION) +static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; +#else +static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; +#endif + +static const char * const gds_strings[] = { + [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", + [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", + [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", + [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", +}; + +bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void) +{ + return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL || + gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated); + +void update_gds_msr(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl_after; + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + switch (gds_mitigation) { + case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF: + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED: + /* + * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have + * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all + * CPUs. + */ + case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL: + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; + break; + case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE: + case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: + case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: + return; + }; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + + /* + * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to + * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot + * processor was not. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after); + WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after); +} + +static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void) +{ + u64 mcu_ctrl; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + return; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; + goto out; + } + + if (cpu_mitigations_off()) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ + + /* No microcode */ + if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) { + /* + * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it + * here rather than in update_gds_msr() + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX); + pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n"); + } else { + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; + } + goto out; + } + + /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */ + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { + if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) + pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n"); + + /* + * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs + * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked + * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state + * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will + * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled. + */ + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED; + } + + update_gds_msr(); +out: + pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + return 0; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) + gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; + + return 0; +} +early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline); + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt @@ -2137,6 +2238,165 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline); +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt + +enum srso_mitigation { + SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE, + SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB, + SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, +}; + +enum srso_mitigation_cmd { + SRSO_CMD_OFF, + SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE, + SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET, + SRSO_CMD_IBPB, + SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT, +}; + +static const char * const srso_strings[] = { + [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", + [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only" +}; + +static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; + +static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE; + else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET; + else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB; + else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit")) + srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; + else + pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline); + +#define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html for mitigation options." + +static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) +{ + bool has_microcode; + + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + goto pred_cmd; + + /* + * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order + * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation. + */ + has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(); + if (!has_microcode) { + pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n"); + pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); + } else { + /* + * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf) + * flags for guests. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); + + /* + * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right + * IBPB microcode has been applied. + */ + if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) && + (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + } + + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { + if (has_microcode) { + pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n"); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; + goto pred_cmd; + } + } + + switch (srso_cmd) { + case SRSO_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE: + if (has_microcode) { + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE; + pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE); + } + break; + + case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { + /* + * Enable the return thunk for generated code + * like ftrace, static_call, etc. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS); + else + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET; + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; + } + break; + + case SRSO_CMD_IBPB: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (has_microcode) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB; + } + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; + } + break; + + case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); + srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; + } + } else { + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode")); + +pred_cmd: + if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB)) + x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB; +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt @@ -2335,6 +2595,18 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); +} + +static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", + srso_strings[srso_mitigation], + (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode")); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -2384,6 +2656,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: return retbleed_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_GDS: + return gds_show_state(buf); + + case X86_BUG_SRSO: + return srso_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2448,4 +2726,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); +} + +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index f41781d06a5f3..c1f2360309120 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -18,11 +18,15 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include +#include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -58,6 +62,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpu.h" @@ -961,6 +966,12 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f); + + if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021); + init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); init_speculation_control(c); @@ -1122,6 +1133,12 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ #define RETBLEED BIT(3) +/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */ +#define SMT_RSB BIT(4) +/* CPU is affected by SRSO */ +#define SRSO BIT(5) +/* CPU is affected by GDS */ +#define GDS BIT(6) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1134,27 +1151,30 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), - VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SRSO), VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO), {} }; @@ -1272,6 +1292,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); + /* + * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on + * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by + * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], + * which means that AVX will be disabled. + */ + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO); + } + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; @@ -1413,8 +1448,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpu_set_core_cap_bits(c); - fpu__init_system(c); - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says @@ -1792,6 +1825,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) validate_apic_and_package_id(c); x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); update_srbds_msr(); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) + update_gds_msr(); } static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg) @@ -2109,8 +2144,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) doublefault_init_cpu_tss(); - fpu__init_cpu(); - if (is_uv_system()) uv_cpu_init(); @@ -2126,6 +2159,7 @@ void cpu_init_secondary(void) */ cpu_init_exception_handling(); cpu_init(); + fpu__init_cpu(); } #endif @@ -2188,3 +2222,69 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) /* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */ apic_smt_update(); } + +void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) +{ + identify_boot_cpu(); + + /* + * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the + * core code know. + */ + cpu_smt_check_topology(); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { + pr_info("CPU: "); + print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); + } + + cpu_select_mitigations(); + + arch_smt_update(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) { + /* + * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer + * supported and fixup the utsname. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) + panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); + + init_utsname()->machine[1] = + '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); + } + + /* + * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear + * feature bits. + */ + fpu__init_system(); + fpu__init_cpu(); + + alternative_instructions(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + /* + * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages + * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping + * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. + * + * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems + * very little benefit for that case. + */ + if (!direct_gbpages) + set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); + } else { + fpu__init_check_bugs(); + } + + /* + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA + * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will + * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will + * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It + * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 + * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. + */ + mem_encrypt_init(); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 91df90abc1d9c..66e19380a899d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -78,9 +78,11 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu); +void cpu_select_mitigations(void); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); extern void update_srbds_msr(void); +extern void update_gds_msr(void); extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index 82fe492121bb3..f1cd1b6fb99ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -41,10 +41,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c index 3c0a621b97921..ed73f9b407068 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void) fpu__init_cpu_xstate(); } -static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) +static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) { unsigned long cr0; u16 fsw, fcw; @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; } -static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) { if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { @@ -237,9 +237,9 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(void) * Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial * FPU state that is later cloned into all processes: */ -void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +void __init fpu__init_system(void) { - fpu__init_system_early_generic(c); + fpu__init_system_early_generic(); /* * The FPU has to be operational for some of the diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index a21cd2381fa8f..4955cb5cc0016 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -133,7 +133,20 @@ SECTIONS LOCK_TEXT KPROBES_TEXT ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + *(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain) +#endif + ENTRY_TEXT + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + /* + * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s + * definition. + */ + . = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20); + *(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe) +#endif ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT STATIC_CALL_TEXT @@ -142,13 +155,15 @@ SECTIONS #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE __indirect_thunk_start = .; - *(.text.__x86.*) + *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + *(.text.__x86.return_thunk) __indirect_thunk_end = .; #endif } :text =0xcccc /* End of text section, which should occupy whole number of pages */ _etext = .; + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN @@ -502,6 +517,21 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store); "fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area"); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned"); +. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned"); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO +/* + * GNU ld cannot do XOR so do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR + * of the two function addresses: + */ +. = ASSERT(((srso_untrain_ret_alias | srso_safe_ret_alias) - + (srso_untrain_ret_alias & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)), + "SRSO function pair won't alias"); +#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index de4b171cb76bc..8b07e48612d7d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -491,6 +491,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + /* * Hide all SVM features by default, SVM will set the cap bits for * features it emulates and/or exposes for L1. diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index dc921d76e42e8..1ba9313d26b91 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX}, }; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 7b2b61309d8a4..8544bca6b3356 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1392,7 +1392,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) { sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb; - indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index c18d812d00cd7..a8859c1732580 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S @@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) */ UNTRAIN_RET + /* SRSO */ + ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT + /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 34670943f5435..cf47392005663 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static struct kmem_cache *x86_fpu_cache; static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache; +extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void); + /* * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr. * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access. @@ -1389,7 +1391,7 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_features; ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \ ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \ - ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO) + ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) { @@ -1446,6 +1448,9 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) */ } + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated()) + data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO; + return data; } diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S index 1221bb099afb4..5f7eed97487ec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk @@ -73,6 +74,45 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) */ #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK +/* + * srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at + * special addresses: + * + * - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned + * - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14 + * and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the + * srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared). + * + * This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch + * target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential + * poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted. + * + * As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + .section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain + +SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) + ASM_NOP2 + lfence + jmp __x86_return_thunk +SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias) +__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias) + + .section .text.__x86.rethunk_safe +#endif + +/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */ +SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + add $8, %_ASM_SP + UNWIND_HINT_FUNC +#endif + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 +SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias) + .section .text.__x86.return_thunk /* @@ -85,7 +125,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array) * from re-poisioning the BTB prediction. */ .align 64 - .skip 63, 0xcc + .skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret); /* @@ -117,10 +157,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN(zen_untrain_ret); * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation * which will be contained safely by the INT3. */ -SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL) +SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ret int3 -SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) +SYM_CODE_END(__ret) /* * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete. @@ -131,11 +171,44 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction. * INT3 is for SLS protection. */ - jmp __x86_return_thunk + jmp __ret int3 SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret) __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret) +/* + * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret() + * above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a + * + * movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax + * + * and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret() + * later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and + * thus a "safe" one to use. + */ + .align 64 + .skip 64 - (srso_safe_ret - srso_untrain_ret), 0xcc +SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE) + .byte 0x48, 0xb8 + +SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + add $8, %_ASM_SP + ret + int3 + int3 + int3 + lfence + call srso_safe_ret + int3 +SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret) +SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret) +__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret) + +SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk) + ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \ + "call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS + int3 +SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk) #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index ff3b0d8fe0486..dd15fdee45366 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c @@ -804,9 +806,12 @@ void __init poking_init(void) spinlock_t *ptl; pte_t *ptep; - poking_mm = copy_init_mm(); + poking_mm = mm_alloc(); BUG_ON(!poking_mm); + /* Xen PV guests need the PGD to be pinned. */ + paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(NULL, poking_mm); + /* * Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page * will be mapped at the same PMD. We need 2 pages, so find space for 3, diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c index 64873937cd1d7..755e939db3ed3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ static void cpu_bringup(void) cr4_init(); cpu_init(); + fpu__init_cpu(); touch_softlockup_watchdog(); preempt_disable(); diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 69b29d1982494..0000000000000 --- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -/* - * include/asm-xtensa/bugs.h - * - * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. - * - * Xtensa processors don't have any bugs. :) - * - * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General - * Public License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of - * this archive for more details. - */ - -#ifndef _XTENSA_BUGS_H -#define _XTENSA_BUGS_H - -static void check_bugs(void) { } - -#endif /* _XTENSA_BUGS_H */ diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 33e0526907ebd..2db1e0e8c1a7d 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -579,6 +579,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -590,6 +602,8 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -603,6 +617,8 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_srbds.attr, &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, + &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, + &dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 379ac9ca60b70..1c366ddf62bc5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; - nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; + nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1; copy_count(skb) = 0; XENVIF_TX_CB(skb)->split_mask = 0; @@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } } - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; + shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, @@ -476,12 +476,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, txp++; } - if (frag_overflow) { + if (nr_slots > 0) { shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); frags = shinfo->frags; - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow; + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; @@ -492,6 +492,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; + } else if (nskb) { + /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed + * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. + */ + kfree_skb(nskb); } (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops; diff --git a/include/asm-generic/bugs.h b/include/asm-generic/bugs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 69021830f078d..0000000000000 --- a/include/asm-generic/bugs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H -#define __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H -/* - * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for - * architecture-dependent bugs. - */ - -static inline void check_bugs(void) { } - -#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 24e5f237244d8..358905a859938 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, @@ -188,6 +190,12 @@ void arch_cpu_idle_enter(void); void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void); void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT +void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void); +#else +static inline void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { } +#endif + int cpu_report_state(int cpu); int cpu_check_up_prepare(int cpu); void cpu_set_state_online(int cpu); diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h index 2832cc6be062b..e8304e929e283 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/task.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p); void __noreturn do_task_dead(void); void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr); +extern void mm_cache_init(void); extern void proc_caches_init(void); extern void fork_init(void); @@ -89,7 +90,6 @@ extern void exit_itimers(struct task_struct *); extern pid_t kernel_clone(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs); struct task_struct *create_io_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, int node); struct task_struct *fork_idle(int); -struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void); extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags); extern long kernel_wait4(pid_t, int __user *, int, struct rusage *); int kernel_wait(pid_t pid, int *stat); diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index d8bfe61b5a889..298989b0d4e88 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -95,12 +95,10 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -774,8 +772,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void) } #endif -void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { } - void __init __weak poking_init(void) { } void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { } @@ -839,6 +835,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void) init_espfix_bsp(); /* Should be run after espfix64 is set up. */ pti_init(); + mm_cache_init(); } void __init __weak arch_call_rest_init(void) @@ -903,7 +900,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void) sort_main_extable(); trap_init(); mm_init(); - + poking_init(); ftrace_init(); /* trace_printk can be enabled here */ @@ -993,14 +990,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void) */ locking_selftest(); - /* - * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA - * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will - * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will - * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. - */ - mem_encrypt_init(); - #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok && page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) { @@ -1017,6 +1006,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void) late_time_init(); sched_clock_init(); calibrate_delay(); + + arch_cpu_finalize_init(); + pid_idr_init(); anon_vma_init(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86 @@ -1043,9 +1035,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void) taskstats_init_early(); delayacct_init(); - poking_init(); - check_bugs(); - acpi_subsystem_init(); arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); sfi_init_late(); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index c6a289317e89b..31455f5ab015a 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -2424,11 +2424,6 @@ struct task_struct * __init fork_idle(int cpu) return task; } -struct mm_struct *copy_init_mm(void) -{ - return dup_mm(NULL, &init_mm); -} - /* * This is like kernel_clone(), but shaved down and tailored to just * creating io_uring workers. It returns a created task, or an error pointer. @@ -2823,10 +2818,27 @@ static void sighand_ctor(void *data) init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh); } -void __init proc_caches_init(void) +void __init mm_cache_init(void) { unsigned int mm_size; + /* + * The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is + * dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system + * can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids). + */ + mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size(); + + mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct", + mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN, + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, + offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), + sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), + NULL); +} + +void __init proc_caches_init(void) +{ sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache", sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU| @@ -2844,19 +2856,6 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void) SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); - /* - * The mm_cpumask is located at the end of mm_struct, and is - * dynamically sized based on the maximum CPU number this system - * can have, taking hotplug into account (nr_cpu_ids). - */ - mm_size = sizeof(struct mm_struct) + cpumask_size(); - - mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct", - mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN, - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, - offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), - sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv), - NULL); vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT); mmap_init(); nsproxy_cache_init(); diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index ec53f52a06a58..2ae4d74ee73b4 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ -#define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ +#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32 ( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT ( 3*32+17) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* FREE! ( 3*32+17) */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) /* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */ #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+20) */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ @@ -236,7 +236,6 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD ( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL ( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL ( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES ( 8*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/ @@ -299,6 +298,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */ @@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_AVIC (15*32+13) /* Virtual Interrupt Controller */ #define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD (15*32+15) /* Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */ #define X86_FEATURE_VGIF (15*32+16) /* Virtual GIF */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK (15*32+28) /* "" SVME addr check */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ECX), word 16 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI (16*32+ 1) /* AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation instructions*/ @@ -389,6 +390,13 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES (18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +/* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME (19*32+ 0) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV (19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH (19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES (19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index d109c5ec967ce..a50f075244b44 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index 3ff0d48469f28..b2d504f119370 100644 --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) +#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c index d8f47704fd85f..5b915ebb61163 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c +++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c @@ -652,5 +652,8 @@ bool arch_is_retpoline(struct symbol *sym) bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym) { - return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk"); + return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk") || + !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_untrain_ret") || + !strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret") || + !strcmp(sym->name, "__ret"); }